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Reward and punisher experience 
alter rodent decision‑making 
in a judgement bias task
Vikki neville1*, Jessica King2, iain D. Gilchrist3, peter Dayan4,5, elizabeth S. paul1,5 & 
Michael Mendl1,5
The influence of affective states on decision-making is likely to be complex. Negative states resulting 
from experience of punishing events have been hypothesised to generate enhanced expectations 
of future punishment and ‘pessimistic’/risk-averse decisions. However, they may also influence how 
decision-outcomes are valued. Such influences may further depend on whether decisions at hand 
are germane to the rewards or punishers that induced the affective state in the first place. Here 
we attempt to dissect these influences by presenting either many or few rewards or punishers of 
different types (sucrose vs air-puff; 50 kHz vs 22 kHz ultrasonic vocalisations) to rats, and investigating 
their subsequent decisions in a judgement bias task that employed sucrose and air-puff as decision 
outcomes. Rats that received many sucrose pellets prior to testing were more risk‑averse than those 
receiving many air-puffs. Ultrasonic vocalisations did not alter decision-making. Computational 
analysis revealed a higher weighting of punishers relative to rewards (in agreement with findings from 
a separate behavioural task) and a bias towards the risk-averse response following pre-test sucrose 
compared to pre-test air-puff. Thus, in this study reward and punisher manipulation of affective 
state appeared to alter decision-making by influencing both expectation and valuation of decision-
outcomes in a domain-specific way.
Certain features of negatively and positively valenced affective states are phylogenetically  widespread1–5, suggest-
ing that affect confers an evolutionary advantage. A prominent hypothesis is that affect, having both transient and 
longer-lasting components, provides information about the ongoing state of the environment and an animal’s 
situation within it, thereby allowing adaptive behavioural decision-making2,4,6,7. Sensory information can be 
noisy and there may be some degree of overlap between cues that signal the arrival of rewards or punishers and 
background noise. When decisions need to be made about how best to respond to such complex and sometimes 
ambiguous information to maximise fitness, affective states may be  valuable8. For example, a rustling noise could 
either signal an approaching predator or just be the sound of wind moving vegetation. In such a situation a prey 
animal must decide whether to flee, which would be energetically costly but avoid the risk of predation, or to 
ignore the noise and conserve energy but risk attack. Repeated prior encounters with aversive and punishing 
stimuli (things that animals work to avoid) are suggested to lead to a negative affective state (see operational 
definitions in Rolls  20059; Paul and Mendl  201810; Mendl and Paul  20208) which decrease an individual’s thresh-
old for responding to future potentially threatening signals and hence favours safety-first, risk-averse decisions 
under  ambiguity3,4. However, an animal that has experienced few punishing experiences, and is consequently 
in a less negative state, might have a higher response threshold for potential  threats2–4. Similarly, such affective 
states might oppositely modulate an individual’s threshold for responding to potential rewards.
In essence, functional explanations of affect such as these suggest that ‘emotions’ and ‘moods’ encode 
information about past reward and punisher experience and hence act as Bayesian-like priors on the prob-
ability of rewarding and punishing decision-outcomes, thus allowing optimisation of future reward acquisition 
and punisher  avoidance2,4,6,7. However, it is also likely that past experience and resulting affective states (e.g. 
depression-related  anhedonia11–13) influence not just estimates of the probability of decision outcomes but also 
their value. The influence of past experience on reward and punisher valuation might have opposite effects on 
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decision-making compared with its influence on reward and punisher probability estimation. For example, inhab-
iting an environment in which threats are frequent might increase an individual’s estimation of the probability 
of punishers (resulting in ‘pessimistic’/risk-averse decision-making) but also increase their valuation of food 
(resulting in more ‘optimistic’/risk-seeking decision-making) as maintaining the high energy reserves needed 
to evade predation becomes more  important14. Likewise, an environment that is abundant in food might lead to 
both an increased probability estimation of rewards (‘optimistic’/risk-seeking decision-making) but a decreased 
valuation of food (‘pessimistic’/risk-averse decision-making) via satiation.
Furthermore, a key component of functional hypotheses of affect is the notion of ‘domain generality’; the 
proposal that the affective system encapsulates an individual’s general experiences of reward and punishment 
(and the prevalence and severity of these), regardless of the specific types of rewards and punishers concerned. 
Thus it is hypothesised that affective states or moods reflect a kind of meta-learning, not just about the probability 
and value of each individual punisher and reward they are likely to come across in their environment, but about 
rewards and punishers in general. A broadly negative state would be expected to arise if punishers are common 
and severe while rewards are sparce and slight, and to drive more cautious and risk-averse decisions across 
domains. This would be adaptive if such domain-general states and effects reflect actual correlations between 
different types of reward and different types of punishers in an animal’s everyday life.
The relationship between affect and decision-making may thus be complex. The way in which decisions are 
influenced is likely to depend on whether and how affective states alter perceived likelihoods and values of differ-
ent decision outcomes, and also on whether they have a domain-general influence across all reward and punisher 
types, or exert a domain-specific effect on decisions that are directly related to the rewards and punishers which 
induced the current affective state. Disentangling these possibilities has implications not just for our understand-
ing of the functional role of affective states, but also for the utility of measuring changes in decision-making as 
markers of affective  valence8,15–17.
The aim of this paper is to address these issues using a paradigm developed specifically to evaluate the influ-
ence of affective states on decision-making under ambiguity. The judgement bias task is a widely used transla-
tional paradigm for the investigation of affective state, and hence welfare, across numerous species including rats, 
starlings, sheep and  humans15–23. In a common variant of this task, an individual is trained to choose between 
two different actions in response to two sensory stimuli that occupy different ends of a sensory continuum (e.g. 
high and low pitched tones). One action is ‘safe’, leading to neither reward nor punishment for either stimulus. 
The other action is ‘risky’; whether the animal receives a reward or punishment following its execution depends 
on the previous discriminatory sensory stimulus. During training, animals learn to accurately discriminate 
between cues that predict rewards and those that predict punishment by performing one of the two alterna-
tive responses. During testing, they are also required to take one of the actions in response to occasional new, 
intermediate, ambiguous sensory stimuli. Individuals who are more risk-seeking or ‘optimistic’ (less likely to 
execute the ‘safe’ action) when presented with intermediate ambiguous stimuli are thought to be experiencing 
a more positively-valenced affective state compared with those that are more risk-averse or ‘pessimistic’ (i.e. 
more likely to execute the ‘safe’ action) . A recent meta-analysis indicates general support for this hypothesis, 
but significant heterogeneity in  findings17. One possibility is that the influence of affective manipulations alters 
both the perceived likelihood and valuation of decision-outcomes. Dissecting any such effects should thus aid 
in the interpretation of findings, and help explain contradictory results.
In this study we used the judgement bias task in rats to investigate three questions. (1) Are individuals more 
risk-seeking in the judgement bias task following experience of rewards compared to punishers, and is this 
dependent on reward and punisher prevalence? (2) Does this effect depend on the extent to which the rewards 
and punishers are ‘task-specific’ (i.e. the same as those used in the judgement bias task), or can experience of 
rewards and punishers in one domain influence decision-making in another domain? (3) Does risk-seeking 
or risk-averse behaviour in these situations arise from modulation of the perceived likelihood and/or value of 
rewarding and punishing outcomes?
To answer these questions, we delivered either many or few rewards or punishers to rats immediately prior 
to a judgement bias task. The rewards or punishers were either task-specific (sucrose pellet vs air-puff) or task 
irrelevant (50 kHz ‘positive’ vs 22 kHz ‘negative’ ultrasonic  vocalisations24). To investigate whether these stimuli 
influenced decision-making by altering perceived likelihood or valuation of decision outcomes, judgement bias 
data were analysed using computational modelling that allowed the influence of these parameters to be modelled. 
Independently, we also studied the influence of the same stimuli on a progressive ratio lever-pressing task to 
investigate how they altered motivation to work for (valuation of) the sucrose reward decision-outcome used 
in the judgement bias task.
Results
We administered an automated judgement bias  task25 in which rats responded on each trial to stimuli (auditory 
tones ranging from 2 to 8 kHz) that either unambiguously (2 kHz or 8 kHz) or ambiguously (intermediate tones) 
predicted rewards (sucrose pellet) and punishers (air puff). Before completing each test session, animals were 
exposed to one of eight different environments in a randomised, factorial, repeated measures design. In each 
pre-test environment, three factors were systematically varied: valence (reward versus punisher), task-specificity 
(specific: rewards and punishers the same as those used in the subsequent judgement bias task (sucrose or air 
puff) versus non-specific: rewards and punishers not the same as those used in the judgement bias task (auditory 
playback of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ ultrasonic vocalisations)) and prevalence of rewards and punishers (low versus 
high). We employed a model-agnostic statistical analysis to summarise the raw data and we fitted a Bayesian 
decision-theoretic  model21 which allowed us to estimate parameters relating to the decision-making process, 
namely reward valuation and probability estimation. A progressive ratio lever pressing task for sucrose pellet 
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rewards was also administered to the rats. This provided an additional behavioural measure of reward valuation 
to complement the measure of reward and punisher valuation obtained through the model-dependent analysis 
of the judgement bias data.
Statistical analysis: judgement bias data. Stimulus tone was a significant predictor of response, indi-
cating that rats were able to discriminate between the stimuli used in the judgement bias task (Likelihood ratio 
test, LRT = 3,628.970, p < 0.001 ). Rats tended to be more risk-seeking when the outcome of the previous trial 
was more aversive (LRT = 3.023, p = 0.082) and were significantly more risk-seeking when the 2 kHz compared 
with the 8 kHz tone was rewarded (LRT = 14.331, p < 0.001 ). Manipulation valence (LRT = 2.300, p = 0.129), 
task-specificity (LRT = 0.109, p = 0.741), prevalence (LRT = 0.762, p = 0.383), and number of trials completed 
(LRT = 2.409, 0.121) were not significant as main effects. However, there was a marginally non-significant inter-
action between valence and prevalence (Fig. 1: LRT = − 2.294, p = 0.075) and a significant interaction between 
valence and task-specificity (Fig. 1: LRT = 2.753, p = 0.021). Post-hoc analyses indicated that the difference in 
judgement bias was greatest between rats exposed to the high prevalence rewards compared to high prevalence 
punishers, and only for task-specific rewards compared to task-specific punishers (Table  1). The interaction 
between valence and stimulus was non-significant (LRT  =  5.523, p  =  0.238) as was the interaction between 
valence, prevalence, and task-specificity (LRT = 0.794, p = 0.672). In sum, rats were most risk-seeking following 
delivery of pre-test air-puffs at a high prevalence and most risk-averse following delivery of pre-test sucrose at 





























































































































Figure 1.  Mean proportion of ‘risk-seeking’ (stay) responses in both the observed and model-generated data 
split by tone presented following experience of high or low prevalence rewards or punishers and following 
experience of rewards or punishers that were either task specific or USVs. The top plots show the observed 
data while the bottom plots show the data generated using the model. The left-hand plots show the data split 
by task-specificity and manipulation valence (i.e. sucrose—green dashed line; air-puffs—green solid line; 
50 kHz USVs—pink dashed line; 22 kHz USVs—pink solid line) and the right-hand plots show the data split 
by manipulation prevalence and valence (i.e. high prevalence rewards—purple dashed line; high prevalence 
punishers—purple solid line; low prevalence rewards—orange dashed line; and low prevalence punishers—
orange solid line). Error bars represent one standard error.
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To investigate whether there were treatment differences in rats’ behaviour following sucrose or air-puff deliv-
ery which might indicate satiation to sucrose or habituation to the air-puffs, we analysed the rats’ latency to 
initiate the next trial following these outcomes as a proxy for sucrose consumption speed and air-puff recovery 
time. The duration of self-determined inter-trial intervals following sucrose delivery was not affected by the 
interaction between manipulation valence, prevalence, and task-specificity (LRT = 0.210, p = 0.647), between 
manipulation valence and task-specificity (LRT = 1.856, p = 0.173) or between manipulation valence and preva-
lence (LRT = 0.088, p = 0.767). Similarly, the interactions between manipulation valence, prevalence, and task-
specificity (LRT = 0.889, p = 0.346), between manipulation valence and task-specificity (LRT = 1.276, p = 0.259), 
and between manipulation valence and prevalence (LRT = 0.515, p = 0.473) were not significant predictors of 
the duration of the self-determined inter-trial interval following air-puff delivery.
Statistical analysis: progressive ratio lever pressing data. In the progressive ratio lever pressing 
task, rats pressed the lever more when they had experienced pre-test punishers than pre-test rewards (mean 
number of lever presses ± standard error, SE: reward: 159± 20.4 , punishers: 167± 14.1 , LRT = 4.944, p = 0.026). 
The numerical prevalence of pre-test rewards and punishers ( LRT < 0.001 , p = 0.993 ), or task-specificity 
(LRT  =  1.927, p  =  0.165) did not significantly predict the number of lever presses. There was a marginally 
non-significant interaction between manipulation valence and prevalence (Fig.  2: LRT  =  3.003, p  =  0.083). 
While there was a significant difference between rats that experienced high prevalence rewards and high preva-
Table 1.  Results of the post-hoc analyses of the interaction between manipulation prevalence and valence, 
and manipulation specificity and valence on judgement bias data. Bold values highlight statistically significant 
results.
Contrast z-value p-value
Task-specific vs. non-specific rewards − 1.429 0.417
Task-specific vs. non-specific punishers 2.093 0.120
Non-specific rewards vs. punishers 0.751 0.845
Task-specific rewards vs. punishers 2.753 0.021
High vs. low prevalence rewards 2.018 0.142
High vs. low prevalence punishers − 0.598 0.914
Low prevalence rewards vs. punishers − 0.328 0.984



























Figure 2.  The effect of manipulation valence and prevalence on the log-transformed number of lever presses 
collapsed across task-specificity. Error bars represent one standard error.
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lence punishers (mean number of lever presses ± SE: reward: 159± 32.1 , punishers: 174± 20.2 , LRT = − 2.913, 
p = 0.013), no significant difference was observed between rats that experienced rewards and punishers at a 
low prevalence (LRT  =  0.421, p  =  0.967), or between rats experiencing rewards at a high or low prevalence 
(LRT = 1.248, p = 0.533), or punishers at a high or low prevalence (LRT = − 1.247, p = 0.534). There was no sig-
nificant interaction between manipulation valence and task-specificity (sucrose/air puffs versus USVs) (LRT =  
0.074, p = 0.785), or between manipulation valence, task-specificity, and prevalence (LRT = 0.312, p = 0.856). 
Thus, rats were most motivated to obtain sucrose when they had received pre-test punishers at a high prevalence 
and least motivated to obtain sucrose when they had received pre-test rewards at a high prevalence, irrespective 
of reward and punisher type.
Model‑dependent analysis. We fitted a Bayesian-decision theoretic model to the judgement bias decision 
data, testing which of the complete collection of parameters were required to explain the data most parsimoni-
ously. The full model included six parameters: bias ( δ ), differential sensitivity to outcome punishment versus 
reward ( Cp/r ), a slope parameter which accounted for differences in the rats’ ability to discriminate between the 
stimuli ( σ ), a lapse rate which accounted for errors independent of the presented stimulus (  ), and parameters 
which allowed decision-making to vary according to the previous outcome during the test session ( ω ) and 
according to which of the two reference stimuli were rewarded and punished ( β ). The latter two parameters 
allowed us to account for effects observed in the model-agnostic analysis. Each model was fitted using a four-
level hierarchical Bayesian random effects analysis with a single top level empirical prior distribution of the 
model parameters across all subjects and within each subject (see Fig. 3). Therefore, the model fitting procedure 
was blind to the existence of the different conditions. Unlike the remaining parameters, β was fitted at three lev-
els instead of four levels, this was because we anticipated that intrinsic preference for one or other tone would be 
constant within a subject (noting that which tone was rewarded was also constant for a subject).
When penalizing model complexity (using a form of Bayesian information criterion; BIC), the most par-
simonious model included all six of these parameters ( δ , Cp/r ,  , and σ , ω , and β ; Fig. 1, Table 2). Across all 
conditions and subjects, the log-transformed parameter estimates of Cp/r were significantly less than zero (mean 
± SE: −1.103± 0.023 , p < 0.001 ) while the estimates of δ were also significantly less than zero (mean ± SE: 
− 0.100 ± 0.045, p = 0.026). This suggests that general risk-seeking behaviour observed in the rats during the 
judgement bias task is attributed to greater sensitivity to within-test rewards relative to within-test punishers, 
and that this effect may be attenuated by an overall bias towards the risk-averse response. The estimates of ω 
(mean ± SE: −0.189± 0.045 , p < 0.001 ) and β (mean ± SE: 0.569± 0.032 , p < 0.001 ) were also significantly 
less than zero, suggesting that, as was also observed in the model-agnostic analysis, rats were more risk-averse 
when the previous outcome had been more favourable and also when the rewarded stimulus was the 8 kHz tone 
as opposed to the 2 kHz tone.
We subsequently assessed the association between the posterior parameters for Cp/r and δ of the best fitting 
model and the conditions. The estimates of Cp/r for the pre-test high prevalence reward treatment were signifi-
cantly greater (i.e. greater sensitivity to punishers than rewards) than for the pre-test high prevalence punisher 
Figure 3.  The hierarchical structure of the model-dependent analysis: each choice is determined by the 
treatment-level parameter distributions, which are determined by the subject-level parameter distributions, and 
these subject-level parameter distributions are determined by a top-level parameter distribution.
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treatment (mean ± SE: −0.998± 0.061 vs.−1.164± 0.044 , z = − 3.005 , p = 0.010 , Fig. 4, Table 3) and tended to 
be greater for the high prevalence reward treatments than for the low prevalence reward treatment (mean ± SE: 
−0.998± 0.061 vs.−1.122± 0.035 , z = − 2.238 , p = 0.086 , Fig. 4, Table 3). Additionally, estimates of Cp/r for the 
pre-test sucrose (i.e. task-specific reward) treatment were significantly greater than for the pre-test air-puff (i.e. 
task-specific punisher) treatment (mean −0.997± 0.058 SE: ± vs.−1.180± 0.038 , z = 3.334 , p = 0.003 , Fig. 4, 
Table 3) and the estimates of Cp/r tended to be greater for the pre-test sucrose (i.e task specific reward) treatment 
than for the pre-test 50 kHz (i.e. non-specific reward) treatment (mean ± SE: −0.997± 0.058 vs.−1.122± 0.040 , 
z = − 2.285 , 0.076, Fig. 4, Table 3). The parameter estimates of δ also depended on treatment. Specifically, 
estimates of δ for the pre-test sucrose (i.e. task-specific reward) treatment were significantly lower (i.e. a more 
negative bias) than for the pre-test air-puff (i.e. task-specific punisher) treatment (mean ± SE: −0.297± 0.110 
vs.0.135± 0.074 , z = − 3.634 , p = 0.001 , Fig. 4, Table 3), and the estimates of δ were significantly greater for the 
pre-test air-puff (i.e task specific punisher) treatment than for the pre-test 22 kHz (i.e. non-specific punisher) 
treatment (mean ± SE: 0.135 ± 0.074 vs.−0.196± 0.060 , z = 2.786 , 0.020, Fig. 4, Table 3). The remaining compari-
sons tested were not significant (Fig. 4, Table 3). Thus, our results suggest that the greater risk-aversion induced 
by pre-test reward compared to punisher experience can be attributed to a greater valuations of punishers than 
rewards and also a bias towards the safe (i.e. ‘leave’) response.
Discussion
Affective state is thought to allow adaptive decision-making by reflecting an individual’s previous experience of 
rewards and punishers. To examine this putative function of affect, we aimed to answer three questions about 
the relationship between previous experience of rewards and punishers and current decision-making: (1) Are 
individuals more risk-seeking in the judgement bias task following experience of rewards compared to punish-
ers and is this dependent on reward and punisher prevalence? (2) Does this effect also depend on the extent to 
which the rewards and punishers are task-specific? (3) Does this risk-seeking or risk-averse behaviour arise from 
modulation of the likelihood and/or the value of rewards and punishers?
We found evidence that (1) individuals were not more risk-seeking in the judgement bias task following 
reward compared with punisher experience but instead were more risk-averse; this effect was dependent on 
reward and punisher prevalence with a greater effect found between rats that experienced the high compared 
to low prevalence rewards and punishers (an effect that was marginally non-significant in the model-agnostic 
analysis but significant in the model-dependent analysis); (2) this risk-aversion was greater when the rewards 
and punishers were task-specific according to both analytical approaches; (3) the observed judgement bias was 
found to result from a greater weighting of within-test punishers relative to within-test rewards (i.e. the relative 
valuation of punishers compared to rewards) in rats with pre-test experience of sucrose compared with pre-test 
experience of air-puffs. Further support for this finding came from using the progressive ratio lever pressing 
task, in which rats worked harder for sucrose following pre-test experience of punishers compared to rewards. 
There was also evidence that it arose from a bias towards the risk-averse response.
Thus, although as hypothesised, judgement bias was modulated by the extent to which an individual’s previ-
ous experience was rewarding or punishing, our results do not support the hypothesis that reward experience 
necessarily induces more risk-seeking decision-making relative to heightened punisher experience. Instead, 
our results may reflect either that rewards can in fact be more valuable in negative affective states (and therefore 
more likely to be sought via the risky response), or that the contrast from the prior negative affect induction to 
the test induced a relatively positive affective state, generating the hypothesized association between this state 
and a more risk-seeking response profile.
Reward and punisher experience may indeed have induced relatively more positive and negative affective 
states respectively, but these were expressed in a way that we had not originally hypothesised. An individual 
Table 2.  BIC scores for computational models of judgement bias decision data.
Model Parameters BIC
δ , Cp/r ,  , σ , ω , β 0.000
Cp/r ,  , σ , ω , β 6.434
 , σ , ω , β 162.770
Cp/r , σ ω , β 296.562
δ ,  , ω , β 304.763
δ Cp/r , σ , ω , β 307.135
δ , σ , ω , β 325.092
δ Cp/r ,  , ω , β 327.474
Cp/r ,  , ω , β 327.854
σ , ω , β 536.776
 , ω , β 544.498
δ , Cp/r ω , β 999.956
δ , ω , β 1,004.187
Cp/r , ω , β 1,158.868
ω , β 1,418.546
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Figure 4.  The mean parameter estimates of Cp/r (top plots) and δ (bottom plots) following experience of 
rewards or punishers that were either task specific or USVs (left-hand plots) and delivered and a high or low 
prevalence (right-hand plots). Higher values of Cp/r reflect a greater weighting of punishers to rewards, and 
higher values of δ reflect a greater bias towards the ‘risk-seeking’ response. Error bars represent one standard 
error.
Table 3.  Results of pair-wise comparisons of the estimates of Cp/r and δ between different pre-test conditions. 
Bold values highlight statistically significant results.
Parameter Contrast z-value p-value
Cp/r
Task-specific vs. non-specific rewards − 2.285 0.076
Task-specific vs. non-specific punishers − 1.219 0.553
Non-specific rewards vs. punishers 0.17 0.998
Task-specific rewards vs. punishers 3.334 0.003
High vs. low prevalence rewards − 2.238 0.086
High vs. low prevalence punishers 0.638 0.898
Low prevalence rewards vs. punishers 0.129 0.999
High prevalence rewards vs. punishers − 3.005 0.010
δ
Task-specific vs. non-specific rewards 2.142 0.108
Task-specific vs. non-specific punishers 2.786 0.020
Non-specific rewards vs. punishers − 1.295 0.502
Task-specific rewards vs. punishers − 3.634 0.001
High vs. low prevalence rewards 0.197 0.996
High vs. low prevalence punishers − 0.266 0.991
Low prevalence rewards vs. punishers − 0.880 0.773
High prevalence rewards vs. punishers 1.343 0.471
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experiencing a negatively valenced affective state could be more risk-seeking if they valued rewards more highly 
or punishers less negatively. Indeed, the model-dependent analysis of data from the judgement bias task revealed 
that rats that had experienced previous air-puffs weighted present within-test punishers less heavily relative to 
within-test rewards than those that had experienced previous sucrose. This suggests that previous punisher 
experience increased the subjective value of the sucrose pellet (and/or decreased the subjective value of the air-
puff) relative to previous reward experience.
There is some precedent for this finding: although anhedonia (i.e. a reduced reward valuation) is considered 
to be a cardinal symptom of  depression26, greater reward valuation has been observed in individuals experiencing 
more negative affective states, especially at the mild end of the spectrum. For example, depression in humans has 
been associated with increased valuation of a number of rewards including  food27,  cigarettes28, and  alcohol29. 
Similarly, animal studies have demonstrated that short-term stress can result in increased reward  valuation30,31. 
It has been suggested this might function to regulate mood by encouraging individuals in poorer mood states 
to seek mood-enhancing  rewards32,33. Additionally, Trimmer et al. (2017) suggested that food should be valued 
more highly in environments in which threats are more frequent as maintaining the high energy reserves needed 
to evade predation becomes more  important14.
An alternate explanation is that our results reflect a contrast effect. Some other studies have also found 
an ‘optimistic’ (i.e. risk-seeking) judgement bias in individuals in affective states that were putatively negative 
(e.g.22,34,35). A commonality between our study and these is the release of individuals from an aversive situation 
immediately prior to testing. In our study the affect manipulation occurred in a different location to the judge-
ment bias task, and thus the context changed between the previous experience of rewards and punishers and 
the present test. As demonstrated by contextual fear conditioning, the context of an environment can become 
associated with emotionally-salient  experiences36,37. Therefore, it is possible that rats experienced a relief-like state 
following removal from the environment in which they had been exposed to punishers, and a disappointment-
like state following removal from the environment in which they had experienced rewards.
Relief and disappointment would be consistent with the successive negative and positive contrast effects 
observed in rats and other species; disappointment-like or elation-like responses observed when an individual 
experiences a downshift or upshift in the availability of a food  reward38–40. Similarly, recent research with human 
subjects has demonstrated that self-reported affect can be modulated by the difference between actual and 
expected earnings (reward prediction error) and not the absolute amount  earned41. A contrast effect would be 
most congruous with the model-dependent analysis which revealed that pre-test reward and punisher experience 
altered both reward and punisher valuation and biased subjects towards or away from the ‘stay’ (i.e. risk-seeking) 
response, the latter being highly associated with  affect8,15,17. The finding that reward valuation was enhanced 
following pre-test air-puff compared to pre-test sucrose experience would also be consistent with the contrast 
induced affective changes proposed here. Numerous studies have identified an association between negative affect 
and a decreased reward  valuation11–13,42,43. This explanation would imply that use of environmental priors can be 
context-dependent. In particular, an individual may recognise that previous experience might not be relevant in 
new contexts, and instead rely on the comparison of conditions between contexts to inform behaviour.
Reward and punisher experience within the test session also altered behaviour. Rats were more likely to make 
the risk-averse response when the previous outcome was more favourable and vice versa; this effect was margin-
ally non-significant in the model-agnostic analysis, and significant in the model-dependent analysis. This could 
indicate that rats are able to recall the most recent tone and compare whether its frequency is higher or lower 
than the current tone to deduce the likely outcome.
One could argue that pre-test sucrose consumption could lead to satiation and accordingly to a reduction of 
sucrose valuation, resulting in apparently risk-averse decision-making independent of changes in affect. How-
ever, although satiation could provide a partial explanation for our results, rats will consume far more sucrose 
pellets within a similar time period given free availability, without showing any signs of satiation and reduction 
in motivation to feed. The maximum number of sucrose pellets a rat could receive in the pre-treatment and test 
session combined was 36. Previous research has shown that rats will consume 50 sucrose pellets in an average of 
5 min44. Additionally, during training for the judgement bias task, rats consumed 48.4 ± 3.2 (mean ± SE) sucrose 
pellets in the 15-min training session on the day prior to discrimination training (i.e. prior to experiencing the 
air-puff), and 57.4 ± 2.4 sucrose pellets in the 30-min training session on the day prior to their first test session.
Moreover, if satiation did underlie our results it might be expected that rats would be increasingly risk-averse 
as the session progressed and more sucrose was consumed, but our analysis found no time-dependent changes in 
judgement bias. Similarly, as the trials are self-initiated, the latency to initiate a trial following sucrose delivery, 
as a proxy of consumption time, can be examined. If rats that had received sucrose prior to testing were sated, 
we would expect that the duration of their self-determined inter-trial intervals following sucrose delivery would 
be increased. However, there were no significant treatment differences in the duration of the self-determined 
inter-trials interval following sucrose delivery. There were also no treatment differences in duration of the inter-
trial intervals following air-puff delivery which would counter the possibility that habituation to the air-puff in 
rats pre-exposed to the air-puff underlies our results.
Satiety following sucrose consumption and habituation to air-puffs are also inconsistent with the model-
dependent analysis which revealed that greater risk-aversion resulting from the pre-test experience arose from 
both an increased sensitivity to outcome punishment versus reward and a bias towards the safe response. If 
satiety or habituation did underlie our results, we would only anticipate treatment-dependent variation in the 
parameter characterising reward and punisher value (i.e. relative sensitivity to rewards and punishers, Cp/r ) 
which was not the case. Likewise, habituation to air-puff cannot explain the results of the lever-pressing task in 
which there was only a rewarding outcome.
This study also revealed that decision-making depended on the task-specificity of previous experience. While 
there was a difference in judgement bias between rats exposed to task-specific rewards and punishers (i.e. ones 
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that were the same as those used in the judgement bias task; pellets and air-puffs), there was no difference between 
rats exposed to the rewarding and punishing ultrasonic vocalisations (USVs). This is contrary to the findings 
of Saito et al. (2016)45, in which a difference in judgement bias was observed between rats that were presented 
with 22 kHz and 50 kHz calls. The simplest explanation for this result is that the USVs were not as rewarding 
or punishing as the sucrose and air-puff, and consequently exerted a much weaker effect on judgement bias. 
Additionally, and unlike the study by Saito et al. (2016), the rats in this study were not housed in social isolation, 
which may have also reduced the salience of the USVs (as a result of increased exposure to USVs and social 
interaction in the home cage). However, this interpretation is not congruent with the findings from the progres-
sive ratio lever pressing task (PRLP task) in which the effect of manipulation valence was not found to depend 
on manipulation task-specificity. A potential explanation for these findings could be that, unlike responses in 
the PRLP task which appeared to be domain-general in its influences (i.e. influenced similarly by both punishers 
and both reward types) prediction of outcomes in the judgement bias task was influenced by specific previous 
experience only. The possibility that previous reward or punisher experience may have both general and specific 
effects on different kinds of decision-making is supported by human neural imaging studies which have dem-
onstrated that there is only partial overlap of prediction error signals during learning with different reward and 
punisher  modalities46,47. The observed interaction between manipulation valence and task-specificity thus raises 
the question of whether judgement bias is sensitive to the task-specificity of the affect manipulation. Although 
numerous studies have found that affect manipulations unrelated to the task influence judgement bias, further 
investigation is needed to determine to what extent the congruity of previous experience to within-task decision-
making modulates judgement bias.
It is notable that variation in judgement bias could be attributed to both a ‘bias’ towards or away from the 
‘risk-averse’ response, and also differences in the relative weighting of punishers and rewards. The study thus 
implicates an important role of reward and punisher valuation in judgement bias. Accordingly, reward and pun-
isher valuation should be considered during experimental design and the interpretation of results of judgement 
bias studies. The modelling approach used here allowed more effective analysis of data by combining together 
information across trials to concentrate the strength of the results; and so results which were marginally non-
significant in the model-agnostic analysis (i.e. the effect of previous outcome; and the pairwise comparison 
between high prevalence rewards and punishers) were then significant in the model-dependent analysis. Con-
sequently, this study highlights the strengths of a computational approach; both in allowing dissection of the 
processes underlying judgement bias and increasing power to detect treatment effects.
Both the model-dependent (in which the parameter characterising the effect was only fitted at the subject-
level—i.e. was the same across treatments for the same subject) and model-agnostic analyses revealed a strong 
effect of which of the tones were rewarded and punished on judgement bias; rats were more risk-seeking when 
the 2 kHz compared the 8 kHz tone was rewarded. This result was also observed by Jones et al. (2018) and might 
reflect that the probe tones are perceptually closer to the 2 kHz than 8 kHz  tone25. This should be investigated 
in future studies.
In summary, although reward and punisher experience altered decision-making (via the relative weighting of 
rewards and punishers and a risk-averse or risk-seeking bias), the affective states that the manipulations induced 
is unclear. The rats in the sucrose condition could have experienced a relatively positive affective state compared 
with the rats in the air-puff condition, with the observed shift in judgement bias reflecting an uncommon but 
nonetheless observed affect-related change in the subjective valuation of rewards or punishers. However, it is also 
possible that the contrast between the manipulation and test environment induced a relatively negative affective 
state in the rats that had experienced pre-test sucrose compared to pre-test air-puffs. This would suggest that 
affect not only depends on previous experience but also the context of such experience.
This study therefore highlights the general conceptual problem in this field of identifying what affective state 
an animal is actually in when investigating and validating measures of animal affect and welfare. Even when 
using an operational definition that links presentation of rewards and punishers to positive and negative affective 
state, differences between environments in which the rewards and punishers are experienced and the test situa-
tion itself may generate contrast effects that influence affect during tests. Utilisation of affect manipulations that 
are active during the tests themselves (e.g. alterations to the test environment such as bright  light48; drugs) and 
home-cage  testing16 offer ways around this problem. Nevertheless, a recent meta-analysis which demonstrated 
a link between pharmacologically-induced negative affect and pessimistic decision-making also identified con-
siderable heterogeneity amongst study  findings17 indicating that links between presumed within-test affective 
states and decision-making are not always straightforward and in line with the general hypothesis that positive 
and negative affective states generate ‘optimistic’/risk-seeking and ‘pessimistic’/risk-averse biases respectively. 
One possible explanation suggested by this study is that affective influences on reward valuation and predicted 
decision outcomes can be disentangled and may sometimes be in opposition, hence generating unexpected 
results. In future work, computational methods will allow a better understanding of the way in which these fac-
tors influence decision-making processes and how they relate to affect and welfare.
Methods
Subjects. Subjects were 16 male Lister Hooded rats (Charles River, Margate, UK). Two rats did not complete 
judgement bias (JB) testing due to poor performance in training; they did not reach the progression criterion 
at the discrimination stage of training (see: Jones et al. (2018)25). The rats were housed in stable pairs in cages 
measuring 560x340x190mm and kept under a 12-h reverse light cycle, with lights off at 7am and on at 7pm. Two 
cardboard tubes and an aspen block were provided as enrichment and subjects had ad libitum access to food 
(LabDiet) and water. This research received ethical approval from the Animal Welfare and Ethical Review Body 
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at the University of Bristol (UIN: UB/16/004) and adhered to ASAB/ABS guidelines for the use of animals in 
research. Subjects were rehomed as pet rats on completion of the experiment.
procedure. Subjects first completed training and testing on the progressive ratio lever pressing (PRLP) task, 
before being trained and tested on the JB task. Prior to each test session, rats received rewards and punishers 
at a high or low prevalence. Once rats had met the criterion to progress to testing for each task, test sessions 
occurred twice per week, on a Tuesday and Thursday, with additional training sessions on Monday, Wednesday, 
and Friday. Rats were not food or water restricted prior to training or testing.
Apparatus. Four identical operant boxes measuring 508× 254× 305mm placed in acoustic isolation 
chambers were used for both the JB task and PRLP task. A wall divided each box into two sections measuring 
254× 254× 305mm . Training and testing of each task occurred in only one of these sections. During the PRLP 
task, a retractable lever was attached to the centre of the end wall of each operant box, and a plastic pot was 
attached to a pellet feeder was placed adjacent to this lever. For the JB task, the retractable lever was replaced 
with a pellet/air-puff delivery trough, the pot was removed, and a speaker was placed on top of each operant 
box (facing down). The pre-test treatment took place in one of two identical operant boxes, both measuring 
305× 178× 355mm in separate isolation chambers in separate rooms adjacent to the testing room. A plastic 
pot was attached to the end wall in both boxes. This pot was attached to a pellet feeder in one box, and an ultra-
sonic speaker was placed in the chamber containing the other box. The operant equipment was manufactured 
by Coulbourn Instruments (Allentown, PA, USA), and operated by Graphic State (v4) software. The ultrasonic 
vocalisations (USVs) were broadcast using Avisoft software and ultrasound gate hardware (Avisoft Bioacoustics, 
Berlin, Germany). The sucrose pellets used throughout the experiment were Bioserv (Frenchtown, NJ, USA) 
Dustless Precision Pellets (45 mg).
Judgement bias task. The JB task followed the methodology of Jones et al. (2018)25. JB task trials were 
self-initiated by the rat inserting their snout into the food delivery trough which led to a tone being played. Rats 
were trained to keep their snout in the trough for 2 s when the positive tone played to receive a sucrose pellet, 
and remove it when the negative tone played to avoid an air-puff. Removal of the snout before 2 s had elapsed 
resulted in no sucrose or air-puff being delivered regardless of the tone presented. The reference tones had a fre-
quency of 2 kHz or 8 kHz, and the positive tone was 2 kHz for half of the rats and 8 kHz for the remaining half. 
In test sessions, three probe tones (2.8 kHz, 4 kHz, 5.6 kHz) were presented on six trials each in addition to the 
reference tones on 21 trials each. As tonal frequency adheres to Weber’s law and is perceived on an approximately 
logarithmic  scale49, these tones were selected as they are equidistant on a log-scale hence allowing the perceived 
differences between the tonal intervals to remain approximately constant. The order of tone presentation was 
randomised and the ambiguous tones were non-reinforced.
progressive ratio lever pressing task. To train rats to press a lever to obtain sucrose, each lever-press 
resulted in the lever retracting for 1 s and a sucrose pellet being delivered into the pot. An autoshaping procedure 
ran simultaneously, such that every 60 s the lever would retract and a sucrose pellet would be delivered, even if 
the lever had not been pressed, after which the lever became re-available50,51. Initially, the duration of the training 
sessions was 15 min. Once subjects had completed at least three 15-min training sessions and had made at least 
15 lever presses in a session, the duration of training sessions was increased to 30 min. Rats progressed to testing 
following completion of two 30-min training sessions in which at least 30 lever presses were made. During test-
ing, the number of presses required before the sucrose pellet was delivered increased in increments of five lever 
presses, starting at one lever press. The test session ended after 30 min had elapsed.
Affect manipulation. Reward or punisher experience was manipulated in the 15  min prior to each JB 
task and PRLP task test session. We adopt Rolls’ (2013) definition of rewards as anything that an animal will 
work for, and a punisher as anything that an animal will attempt to escape from or avoid. The rewards delivered 
were one sucrose pellet or playback of 50 kHz USVs lasting 8 s, and the punishers delivered were an air-puff 
directed towards the rat that was stopped as soon as the rat moved away or playback of 22 kHz USVs of 8 s dura-
tion. Rats will work to hear playback of 50 kHz USVs, which are emitted by rats in situations considered to be 
affectively positive, and will work to avoid playback of 22 kHz USVs which are emitted by rats during unpleas-
ant  experiences24. Similarly, rats will work to obtain sucrose pellets, and will actively escape air-puffs52–54. Each 
reward or punisher was delivered at either a high or low prevalence. The reward or punisher was delivered at 15 
randomly selected times in the high prevalence condition (i.e. an average frequency of once per minute), and 
once at a randomly selected point during the low prevalence condition (i.e. an average frequency of once per 
15 min). The experimental design was within-subject and therefore each rat experienced eight manipulations of 
reward or punisher experience per task over four weeks. Rats experienced the same reward or punisher at differ-
ent prevalences within the same week, the order of rewards or punishers experienced was unique for each rat on 
each task, and this order was assigned randomly. Each rat experienced the high prevalence condition on the first 
test day of the week for half the test weeks (selected randomly for each rat). Except for the air-puff, which was 
administered by the experimenter using an air-cannister (Fellowes, Doncaster, UK: Air Duster 300ml), delivery 
of the rewards and punishers was automated. The 50 kHz USV playback and 22 kHz playback were recorded 
from rats unknown to the experimental subjects. The 50 kHz vocalisations were induced by placing the rats back 
into their home cage following a brief period in a neutral holding cage. The 22 kHz USVs were induced by plac-
ing the rats in an open arena.
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Data analysis. Data analysis comprised two approaches: a model-agnostic (statistical) and model-depend-
ent approach. Decision data from the JB task were analysed using both approaches which assessed whether 
there were treatment differences in JB (model-agnostic analysis) and explored the potential cognitive processes 
underlying these treatment differences (model-dependent analysis). Data from the PRLP task were only ana-
lysed using a model-agnostic approach to assess whether there were treatment differences in the number of lever 
presses made in a session. These data were unsuitable for analysis using a model-dependent approach as each test 
session provided only one data point (i.e. number of lever presses).
Model-agnostic statistical analysis. The response variables analysed were: the total number of lever presses in 
the PRLP task, and the decision to ‘stay’ (risk-seeking) or ‘go’ (risk-averse) in the JB task. These data were ana-
lysed using generalised linear mixed models (GLMM) implemented in the  lme455 and  nlme56 packages in  R57. 
Where models assumed a Gaussian error function, the residuals of each model were visually inspected to verify 
that the model assumptions of normality of error and homogeneity of variance were met. Following log-trans-
formation of the total number of lever presses, these assumptions were not violated in any model. Likelihood-
ratio tests (LRT) were used to assess whether the difference in model deviance was significant when a parameter 
was removed from the model.
These GLMMs included a random effect of individual and session, with session nested within individual. All 
models included the following fixed effects: manipulation valence (reward or punisher), task-specificity (non-
specific or specific), manipulation prevalence (high or low), and interactions between manipulation valence, task-
specificity, and prevalence. Additional fixed effect terms included in the model of decision were: a variable which 
coded whether the 2 kHz or 8 kHz tone was used as the rewarded test stimulus, number of trials completed prior 
to the decision, the tone presented, the favourability of the previous outcome (treated as a continuous variable; 
where 1 = sucrose, 0 = nothing, − 1 = air-puff), and the interaction between stimulus and valence. We verified 
that treating previous outcome as a discrete rather than continuous variable makes no qualitative difference to 
the results. To investigate significant and marginally non-significant interaction terms in the model, post-hoc 
comparisons were conducted using a simultaneous pairwise Tukey procedure for general linear hypotheses 
within the R package  multcomp58.
In addition to the above GLMMs which were used to examine our core research questions, we fitted GLMMs 
to the self-determined inter-trial intervals (i.e. the time between exiting and re-entering the trough between 
trials) following sucrose or air-puff delivery. These GLMMS included a random effect of individual and session, 
with session nested within individual. The predictor variables were the interaction between manipulation valence, 
prevalence, and task-specificity, as this would highlight any treatment differences across the eight treatments, and 
the interactions between manipulation valence and task-specificity and manipulation valence and prevalence, as 
these were identified as significant (or marginally non-significant) predictors of judgement bias. Both GLMMs 
included a term to control for the effect of trial, and terms to control for lower order effects of manipulation 
valence, task-specificity, and manipulation prevalence.
Model-dependent analysis: judgement bias. We used a Bayesian-decision theoretic model to characterise deci-
sion-making in the JB  task21,59. On each trial of the task, subjects are presented with a tone (s) which we consider 
to take values between −2 and 2, where −2 represents the punished reference tone, 2 represents the rewarded 
reference tone, and 0 is equidistant from the reference tones and is thus entirely ambiguous. The subject’s percep-
tion of the tone, x, will inform their estimation of the probability that the tone signals the delivery of a punisher, 
assuming that s < 0 is associated with a punisher, and s > 0 with a reward:
The expected value of making the ‘stay’ response depends on both the probability that the tone presented (s) 
signals a test punisher, given the subject’s perception of the tone (x) and the subject’s subjective value of the test 
sucrose and air-puff, c+ and c− respectively:
The expected reward for making the ‘go’ response is 0. Thus, assuming that the posterior probability of s given x 
follows a Gaussian distribution with mean x and variance σ 2 , i.e. P(s|x) ∼ N(s : x, σ 2) , it is optimal for a subject 
to make the ‘stay’ response under the following condition:
where:
and Cp/r = c
−
c+
 is the differential sensitivity of the air-puff to sucrose.







c+(1− P(pun|x))− c−P(pun|x) > 0
c+(1− φσ (−x))− c
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We include four additional parameters: a lapse rate  to account for non-perceptual errors, a bias term δ to 
allow biases towards or away from ‘stay’ response which thus provides a representation of risk aversion across 
all trial types, and a parameter which allows for variation in decision-making within a test session according to 
the outcome of the most recent trial ( Rt−1 ), ω , and a parameter which allows for between-subject variation in 
decision-making according to whether the 2 kHz ( Rs = 1 ) or 8 kHz ( Rs = −1 ) tone was rewarded, β . The prob-
ability of a subject making the ‘stay’ response on any given trial is given as:
A relatively ‘optimistic’ (i.e. risk-seeking) judgement bias can therefore arise from either values of Cp/r that are 
less than 1 or values of δ greater than 0 . For the purpose of model fitting in which a Gaussian distribution is 
assumed, the values of σ and Cp/r , which were constrained to positive values only, were log transformed, and the 
values of  , which were constrained between zero and one, were logit transformed.
Model fitting. Model fitting was conducted using a four-level hierarchical Bayesian random effects analysis. We 
assume that the parameters hij for each subject i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} across test sessions j ∈ {1, . . . ,Ni} are a random 
sample from a Gaussian distribution hij ∼ N(µi ,�) parameterized by µi , which is itself a random sample from 
a Gaussian distribution µi ∼ N(m,ν) parameterized by m and ν (with diagonal ν ). Here,  is also diagonal, 
and is another parameter. The parameter β , which allows decision-making to depend on which of the stimuli 
is rewarded and punished, is considered to operate solely at the subject level (i.e. fixed across sessions) and so a 
three-level structure was used when fitting this parameter (i.e. top-level, subject-level, and choice data).
The aim of model-fitting is to identify the parameters which maximize the likelihood of the data, D = {Dij} 
for session j of rat i:
We estimated these parameters using an expectation-maximisation procedure, which involved iterating between 
the E and M steps described below until  convergence60. For the kth iteration of the E-step, we use a Laplacian 
approximation based on the model parameters that maximized the likelihood of the data given the prior distribu-
tions (for convenience, not integrating out µi , as would be possible under the current circumstances):
The inverse Hessian of this maximization leads to M covariance matrices, the ith of which, Mi(k) has dimen-
sions (1+ Ni)h× (1+ Ni)h where h is the number of parameters (with rows and columns organized as 
µi , hi1, h
i
2, . . . , h
i
Ni
 ). We write Mixy(k) for the x, yth, [x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . .Ni}] block of this matrix, with Mi00(k) being 
the covariance of µi(k) , Mijj(k) being the covariance of h
i
j(k), [j ∈ {1, . . . ,N
i}] , and Mi0j(k) being the covariance 
between µi(k) and hij(k) , all on iteration k.
The parameters �(k) , m(k) , and ν(k) are then updated in the M-step as follows:
A generative test, in which set parameter values were used to generate data which was then fitted the model, was 
conducted to ensure to verify that the model-fitting procedure recovered the parameters appropriately.
Model comparison. We compared models according to their Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) scores:
Pstay = P(Ep/r(x) > 0|s)
= φσ (s + φ
−1
σ (α))
Pstay = (1− )φσ (s + φ
−1
σ (α)+ δ + ωRt−1 + βRs)+
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where Np is the number of fitted parameters and |D| is the number of data points.
Permutation test and condition comparisons. We used a permutation test to assess whether parameter estimates 
differed from zero, where this was meaningful. This involved calculating the mean parameter estimate and mul-
tiplying randomly selected parameter estimates by minus one and recalculating the mean parameter estimate 
10,000 times. A p-value was obtained by calculating the proportion of resampled means with an absolute differ-
ence greater than or equal to the observed mean. Comparisons between treatment groups, which were based on 
the results of the model-agnostic analysis, were conducted using a simultaneous pairwise Tukey procedure for 
general linear hypotheses within the R package multcomp.
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